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LAW AND POWER: SOME REFLECTIONS ON NICARAGUA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD COURTt
THEODORE M. LIEVERMAN*
In May, 1983, I was part of a delegation of U.S. lawyers who went
to investigate conditions in Nicaragua for a week. During that trip we
met with then U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Anthony Quainton, who
was very charming and, within limits, relatively candid. He began our
one hour meeting by stating: "Nicaragua is a country obsessed with its
history in relationship to the United States." He went on to say, essen-
tially, that Nicaragua tended to see all of its problems and all of its
history as well as its current military, economic and political situation
in relation to the United States, whereas the United States, a world
power, had no such preoccupation with Nicaragua. In fact, Quainton
went on, Nicaragua played a very small part in the United States' vi-
sion of the world and the United States had many other things to keep
it occupied. Ambassador Quainton was implying, of course, that the
disparity in size and strength between the two countries had caused
Nicaragua to blow the situation completely out of proportion.
Indeed, Nicaragua has good reason to be "obsessed" with U.S.
policy. Nicaragua has a population of 3 million as compared to the
United States' 250 million; United States Marines occupied Nicaragua
for over twenty years during this century. At the time of our meeting,
Nicaragua was under direct military attack by the United States
through its proxy troops, the contras. The Sandinista government could
reasonably conclude that the goal of American policy was to destroy
the present government and the ongoing social revolution, and that the
threat of military overthrow of the Nicaraguan government was far
t This article is based on a talk given at the University of Maryland School of
Law on January 30, 1986. The author has edited the text for style, supplied
explanatory footnotes, and made certain changes in light of the subsequent decision on
the merits of the case by the International Court of Justice, see infra note 7.
A more detailed treatment of these issues can be found in Lieverman and
Schneider, Memorandum of Law on U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, Philadelphia
Lawyers Committee on Central America (Nov. 1985), available from PLCCA, 1200
Walnut Street, Suite 400, Philadelphia, PA 19107.
* J.D., 1978, Northeastern School of Law; B.A., 1971, Vassar College; Research
Associate, 1971-72, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.; currently a practic-
ing attorney and Coordinator of the Philadelphia Lawyers Committee on Central
America.
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from an abstract threat.
Had U.S. policymakers thought about it in 1983, they might have
realized that a country like Nicaragua, with a young, creative leader-
ship and a highly organized population committed to their new revolu-
tion, might take some action and bring its conflict with the United
States into an arena where the disparity between the military and the
economic might of the two nations would no longer mean very much,
and where Nicaragua and the United States would be forced to com-
pete according to the same rules. One of those forums was, of course,
the 1984 Summer Olympics held in Los Angeles, where Nicaragua did
not do so well against the United States - although it is worth noting
that Nicaragua, unlike the Soviet Union and many of its allies, did not
boycott the games. The second forum was the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), where on April 9, 1984, Nicaragua filed suit against the
United States. Two years later, on June 27, 1986, the ICJ found for
Nicaragua. Nicaragua's victory no doubt more than offset any disap-
pointment from the Olympics. This article will examine certain aspects
of the World Court's decision, the principles of law underlying it, and
the prospects for enforcing the decision.
I.
A brief history of the case is in order. On April 9, 1984, Nicara-
gua instituted proceedings against the United States,1 alleging that the
U.S. covert war violated the United Nations Charter,2 the Charter of
the Organization of American States,3 other conventions, and custom-
ary international law. Nicaragua further requested that the Court indi-
cate provisional measures - similar to what we would call a preliminary
injunction - calling on the United States to cease and desist its actions
while the Court decided the merits of the case. In response, the U.S.
urged the Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In part, the
United States relied upon a letter sent by Secretary of State Shultz to
the United Nations Secretary-General on April 6, 1984, rejecting the
jurisdiction of the Court over any Central American dispute for a pe-
riod of two years.
On May 10, 1984, the ICJ unanimously rejected the U.S. motion
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States), Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, April 9, 1984.
2. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945; entered
into force on October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1953.
3. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective December 13, 1951), as amended.
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to dismiss and voted 14-1 provisional measures, calling on the United
States to halt its conduct and to respect the sovereignty and indepen-
dence of Nicaragua. The Court further ordered the parties to submit
memoranda of law on the jurisdictional issue.
On November 26, 1984, the World Court determined that it did
indeed have jurisdiction to hear and decide this case.' The United
States responded by refusing to participate any further in the case.6
The Court then considered the further evidence and arguments of Nic-
aragua and on June 27, 1986, issued its final judgment in favor of Nic-
aragua7 as described more fully below.
The jurisdiction of the World Court is set forth in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice which was adopted by most nations
in 1945 at the same time that the UN Charter was adopted.' Article
36(2) of the ICJ Statute says that any state (meaning any nation) can
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court over any legal dispute
and that any state can further qualify that acceptance. 9 Many nations
have deposited qualified acceptances of the Court's jurisdiction with the
ICJ, stating that they will accept the jurisdiction of the Court only in
certain types of cases, or only under certain circumstances. This is, of
course, very different from the practices in the domestic courts of the
United States, where jurisdiction is always compulsory. The United
States, however, accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court with
three narrow limitations10 , and said only that they reserved the right to
withdraw acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court upon six months
notice to the Court."1
What exactly does the ICJ have jurisdiction over? The Statute
says that the Court has jurisdiction over all legal disputes, a rather
4. Nicaragua v. United States, Request for Indication of Provisional Measures,
Order May 10, 1984, 1984 I.C.J. REPORTS, 186 (I.L.M. Vol. XXIII No. 3, May 1984,
468-478).
5. Nicaragua v. United States, ICJ Judgment Jurisdiction of the Court and Ad-
missibility of the Application, 1984 I.C.J. REPORTS 392, 441-443. (I.L.M. Vol. XXIV
No. 1, Jan. 1985 at 59).
6. N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985 at 1, col. 6.
7. Nicaragua v. United States, Merits Judgment, 1986 LC.J. Reports 14, June
27, 1986. (I.L.M. Vol. XXV, No. 5, Sept. 1986, at 1023-1289).
8. Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed at San Francisco, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 933 (effective October 24, 1945). The Statute
was included as an annex to the Charter of the United Nations when the latter was
signed.
9. Id.
10. 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, deposited with the United
Nations, August 26, 1946. For the exceptions, see infra note 40.
11. Id.
1986]
298 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 10
broad and somewhat ambiguous phrase. It is not unreasonable to con-
clude that in any dispute between two or more nations, where the dis-
pute turns on an issue of international law, whether it be a treaty or
customary law, the ICJ has the authority to decide the legal issues.
There may be, as there were in the Nicaraguan case, questions about
whether the court has jurisdiction, but the Statute is clear that when
there are disputes over jurisdiction it is the Court itself which deter-
mines its own jurisdiction.1"
The United States initially appeared in the World Court and made
a number of arguments about why the ICJ should not hear the merits
of the case.13 First, the United States argued that this is not a justicia-
ble case; the World Court was designed to resolve such issues as dis-
putes over fishing rights, interpretation of commercial treaties, and de-
termining boundaries between states. The Court, it was asserted, was
not to become involved in ongoing military disputes. These involve po-
litical questions not susceptible of judicial resolution. Domestically, 4
the political question doctrine is an amorphous concept, deadly to civil
rights lawyers, which allows federal courts to avoid deciding constitu-
tional questions on the grounds that they involve fundamental notions
of separation of powers or are not susceptible to judicial review.15
The United States further argued that a dispute involving ongoing
armed conflict should be addressed by the Security Council, not the
International Court of Justice. This is, of course, a satisfactory situa-
tion for the United States, which has a veto in the Security Council"
but not in the ICJ. The U.S. position here is very different from that in
12. Article 36(6) of the Statue states, "In the event of a dispute as to whether the
Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
The Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning ICJ jurisdic-
tion stated that by accepting jurisdiction under Article 36(2), the United States "would
give the Court the power to decide whether the case properly falls within the terms of
the agreement." S.Rep. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted at 92 Cong.
Rec. 10706 (August 2, 1946).
13. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicaragua v. United States), Countermemorial of the United States submitted
August 17, 1984.
14. Id.
15. Baker v, Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §3-16 (1978); see
L. Henkin, "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?" 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).
16. After the ICJ issued its decision on the merits, Nicaragua indeed applied to
the Security Council for enforcement of the decision pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter. The resolution would have passed 11-1 but for the U.S. exercising its fatal
veto, U.N. SCOR (2704th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2704 (1986), I.L.M. Vol. XXV,
No. 5, 1986, at 1352, 1363.
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1980, when the United States invoked the jurisdiction of the World
Court against Iran over the seizure of the hostages from the American
Embassy. 17 In that case, Iran chose not to appear before the Court,
claiming that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because the matter was then
before the Security Council. The United States adamantly maintained
that there was jurisdiction.
In fact, the Security Council does not preempt the jurisdiction of
the ICJ to decide the legal issues in a dispute, even where the same
conflict is before the Security Council. Nor does it constitute a reason
for the Court to voluntarily refrain from exercising that jurisdiction.
One may bring the same crisis to both places. That is what the World
Court ruled in the case that the United States brought against Iran, 18
and what it ruled in the case Nicaragua brought against the United
States.19 The Court asserted that the Court itself determines jurisdic-
tion, not the parties. The fact that the Security Council has considered
the claims of Nicaragua does not matter. The fact that the Contadora
process of negotiation ° is going on is a welcome sign and the Court
endorsed their efforts, but it is not relevant to the jurisdiction of the
World Court.
As noted above, when the Court took jurisdiction, the United
States reacted in a way which hardly fostered a respect for interna-
tional law. The United States refused to take part in the case on the
merits, thus allowing a decision to be made without further argument
or submissions by the United States. The reason for this decision is
almost certainly because the Reagan administration analyzed its legal
position and decided it was going to lose. The lawyers involved in the
initial submissions on behalf of the United States on jurisdiction are
eminent international lawyers who no doubt understood that the United
States was going to lose this case on the facts and the law. The United
States apparently calculated that it could minimize the loss by simply
walking away and later claiming that the Court was biased and did not
hear the whole story.' It is worth noting that the 14 judges of the ICJ
17. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (United States v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. REPORTS 3, May 24, 1980 (I.L.M. Vol. XIX, No. 3, May 1980, at
553-584).
18. Id. at 28-29.
19. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 5, at 442.
20. The nations of Columbia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have formed a de
facto group to mediate the dispute in Central America; it is named after the place of
its first meeting in Contradora, Venezuela. See id.
21. This has been the consistent line of the present Administration since the deci-
sion was issued, see, e.g., Remarks of Ambassador Vernon Walters, U.N. SCOR
(2701st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2701 (1986), I.L.M. vol. XXV, No. 5 1986, at 1343;
19861
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all come from different countries. Some of those countries are allies of
the United States, others are neutral or Eastern bloc countries. The
justices themselves are not particularly "pro" or "anti" American. The
decision of the ICJ to take jurisdiction over this case was made 14 to 1,
the sole dissenter being the justice from the United States, Stephen
Schwebel.
22
While we do not know exactly what the United States' defense of
its policy in Nicaragua would have been, a review of the U.S.
Countermemorial on jurisdiction and statements by the State Depart-
ment and the President over the last few years shows that the U.S.
relies primarily on the several related theories of self-defense. The
United States would claim that U.S. support for the contras, and its
economic warfare, its mining of the harbors, and attacks on ports - all
of these things amounted to a defense of the United States against the
aggressors - the government of Nicaragua. Although the United
States would probably admit that no Nicaraguan troops have landed in
the United States as of yet and that their army of 40,000 regulars and
60,000 militia is slightly smaller than the United States 3.1 million
members under arms supported by nuclear weapons, the United States
would probably point out that this was a special form of self-defense to
protect other Central American governments from falling to the com-
munists. This is the familiar domino argument, which became infamous
in justifying U.S. intervention in Vietnam twenty years ago. The argu-
ment, asserted quite seriously by U.S. policymakers, is not that Nicara-
gua has now attacked the United States, but that Nicaragua - a mili-
tarized, communist, totalitarian state - will subvert and eventually
overrun El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, and then Guatemala
and Belize. Then, of course, there is' Mexico, an extremely populous,
potentially rich country, and next the Sandinistas will be at the doors
of the United States and it will be too late. 3 Just as we could have
U.N. SCOR (2704th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2704 (1986), I.L.M. vol. XXV, No. 5
1986, at 1364-5.
22. The justices who heard this case were: President Nagendra Singh (India);
Vice-President deLacharriere (France); Judges Lachs (Poland), Ruda (Argentina),
Elias (Nigeria), Oda (Japan); Ago (Italy), Sette-Camara (Brazil), Schwebel (United
States), Jennings (United Kingdom), Mbaye (Senegal), Bedjaoui (Algeria), Zhengyu
(China), Evensen (Norway); Judge ad hoc Colliard (France). Justice Schwebel, prior
to joining the Court in 1981, had been a Legal Advisor to the State Department and
helped represent the United States in the Iran case, supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., Remarks at a White House Briefing, March 5, 1986, 22 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 309, 310, 312 (March 10, 1986); Remarks and a Question and An-
swer Session with Regional Press Representatives, March 11, 1986, 22 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 322-335 (March 17, 1986).
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stopped Hitler in Munich in 1938 but did not, so now can we stop the
communists in Nicaragua before they overrun the Western
Hemisphere.
The second part of this special form of self-defense is collective
security. It is not the United States but El Salvador that is under
armed attack by Nicaragua because of Sandinista support for the
rebels. Moreover, the theory goes, Honduras and Costa Rica are men-
aced by Nicaragua, as evidenced by border incidents and Nicaragua's
"massive" military build-up. The United States is an ally of those
countries with mutual obligations under the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Rio Pact of 1947,24 and the United
States' conduct in Nicaragua right now is an aspect of collective secur-
ity and collective self-defense, if you will, to protect those countries
which are under attack or are being subverted.26 Frequently in connec-
tion with this argument, U.S. policymakers refer to the phrase "revolu-
tion without frontiers", attributing it to the Sandinistas. It is worth not-
ing that the probable origin of this phrase is the State Department, not
Nicaragua.26
There is also a claim frequently made that Nicaragua is engaged
in international terrorism. It is hard to tell if this argument is made
literally and seriously. I think it is hinted at, because terrorism is on
the minds of many people in the United States and around the world.
If stated at length, the argument would be that terrorism is an interna-
tional crime like piracy, and it is therefore the moral and legal respon-
sibility of every civilized nation to fight terrorism, even by means of
armed force. Thus the United States has not only the legal authority,
but the moral obligation to fight terrorism in Nicaragua which, accord-
ing to the United States, is a terrorist state. While not stated quite that
boldly, it is certainly hinted at.
Lastly, the United States defends its policy in Central America by
citing the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that the Marxist totalitarians in
24. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro,
September 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (effective
December 3, 1948).
25. See Countermemorial, supra note 13; Departments of State and Defense,
Background Paper.- Nicaragua's Military Buildup and Support for Central American
Subversion (July 18, 1984).
26. According to Congressman Edward J. Markey, the phrase "revolution without
frontiers," frequently ascribed to the Sandinistas, was actually created in Washington.
Wash. Post, October 24, 1984 at . Administration officials have admitted that they
cannot confirm the source of the phrase, and that at the time, they had not believed
that Nicaragua intended to attack its neighbors, "Nicaraguan Army: 'War Machine'
or Defender of a Besieged Nation?", N.Y. Times, March 30, 1985, at I1, col. 2.
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Nicaragua are not really Nicaraguans but aliens to the Hemisphere,
Soviet proxies who by definition are illegitimate.27 Because they are
alien to the Western Hemisphere, their government is prohibited by the
Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823 when the United States took up
the mantle of anti-imperialism and announced to Europe that it would
not accept any European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.2 8
U.S. involvement in Nicaragua is thus a continuation of that burden
and responsibility.
The problem with all of these arguments made by the United
States government is that they ignore the development of international
law during this century. The United Nation's Charter and the Charter
of the Organization of American States are premised on two funda-
mental concepts: first, that nations will not intervene directly or indi-
rectly in the affairs of other nations, and secondly, nations will not re-
solve their disputes with other nations through a resort to war or the
use of armed force.2 9 The fundamental obligation of a nation is to avoid
27. The political doctrine that communism is an alien force in the Western Hemi-
sphere was probably never so graphically portrayed as in the 1956 movie, Invasion of
the Body Snatchers. Released during the Cold War, the movie depicted an alien life
force which traveled to earth in pods, invaded living bodies, and replaced the human
spirit with a zombie-like intelligence which subserviently worked with other aliens to
disperse still more pods throughout the world. The point was not lost on frantic audi-
ences of the time.
28. MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 776-789
(J. Richardson ed. 1897).
29. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter states as follows:
3. All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.
Article 33 is more specific:
I. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re-
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.
In 1965, the General Assembly approved its "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence
and Sovereignty," G.A. Res. 20/2131 (XX) (December 21, 1965), which states in part:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural ele-
ments, are condemned.
See also the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR
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war, to seek a peaceful resolution of conflicts, and to leave other na-
tions alone. There is one exception spelled out in customary interna-
tional law and in the United Nation's Charter which recognizes the
right of a state to use armed force in the exercise of self-defense. Arti-
cle 51 of the U.N. Charter states as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Se-
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
As a practical matter, the Security Council almost can never take con-
trol of the situation, but Article 51 is very specific about when the use
of armed force is permitted. If the soldiers of another country are para-
chuting into the airports, or if they are crossing the border, or they are
mining the harbors, that is an armed attack on a state and it then has
the right of self-defense. But a state does not have a justification for
use of armed force short of such an attack.30 Article 51 in some ways
creates a narrower scope of self-defense than that available under cus-
tomary international law. It was meant to be narrower. The drafters of
the U.N. Charter had just emerged from a war where upwards of 70
million people had been killed; they were anxious to avoid another
global catastrophe. Article 51 of the Charter therefore provides a very
limited exception for the use of force.
The United States has not met the test for self-defense, either
under the Charter or customary international law. As stated earlier,
there are no Nicaraguan troops fighting in the United States or massed
on the United States borders. No Nicaraguan planes have bombed the
United States, no American harbors have been mined by Nicaraguan
scuba divers. There is no attack making the use of force by the United
Supp. (No. 31) 142; Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference
in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103 (December 9, 1981); Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (October 24, 1970).
30. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 133 (4th Ed. 1981).
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States an "instant and overwhelming necessity."31
If the United States has a dispute with Nicaraguan conduct with
regard to El Salvador, there were very specific steps the United States
(or El Salvador, for that matter) could take. The United States or El
Salvador could take the matter to the World Court, the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nation, or the Organization of American States. The
one thing El Salvador and the United States cannot do is overthrow the
government of Nicaragua to benefit El Salvador.
Another principle of international law with respect to self-defense
is that a state must use the minimum amount of force that is necessary
to deal with the situation. 2 This is a common sense notion that is also
applicable in American domestic law. If somebody slaps you on the
face, it is not really self-defense to pull out a gun and blow the person
away. Where there is a marked disparity in what you are trying to
protect against and the amount of force used, the law refuses to sanc-
tion that use of force. Why? Because the goal is to minimize the use of
force. The same is true at international law.
Even assuming for a moment that Nicaragua has been, as a mat-
ter of state policy, sending arms to El Salvador,33 there is absolutely no
justification at law for the United States to respond by attempting to
overthrow the government of Nicaragua. And that, of course, is exactly
what the United States is trying to do. President Reagan made that
abundantly clear in his famous "cry-uncle" comment. 4 The policy has
31. See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949
I.C.J. REPORTS at 35.
32. VON GLAHN, supra note 30; JESSUP, MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 163-166
(1948); 5 WHITMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 25, passim (1971); BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1958); BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 405-
407 (6th ed. 1978); 2 LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed.
1952).
33. Although the evidence presented in the U.S. press has been vague at best, the
ICJ concluded that arms and other material assistance were delivered through Nicara-
gua to the Salvadoran rebels at least through 1981, with the evidence of such activity
thereafter becoming "weak". However, the Court found the evidence insufficient to
conclude that the Nicaraguan government itself was responsible for such shipments,
and expressly held that such conduct did not amount to an armed attack justifying the
use of armed force in self-defense. Judgment, supra note 7 at paras. 152-53, 160, 238-
39.
34. Press conference, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 212-213 (February 21, 1985).
Other statements of the President are also clear, see News Conference, 19 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 650 (May 4, 1983); Radio Address, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
186-187 (February 16, 1985); Radio address, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 765 (June
8, 1985); Interview, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1006 (August 24, 1985). The House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concluded in 1983 that the purpose of
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nothing to do with the transfer of small arms to the Salvadoran
rebels. 5
With respect to collective security, again the United States has a
right of self-defense to its own territorial integrity, not with respect to
the territory of El Salvador.86 It is not like a tag team wrestling match.
As to the Monroe Doctrine, it is sometimes forgotten that the
Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration of American policy, not
a principle of international law to which other nations have agreed. In
1823 the United States was a relatively weak nation, and the Monroe
Doctrine was disputed by European states and was tested occasionally.
Today, the United States is the strongest nation in the world. When the
United States says it is not going to allow European nations to come
into the western hemisphere, no country will dispute that by force of
arms. But that does not make it law; it is still a unilateral declaration
of policy. The Monroe Doctrine has about as much legal force as a
declaration by Premier Gorbachev that the United States henceforth
will not be allowed into any nation in Europe and that Europe is the
responsibility of the Soviet Union.
It is also worth noting that when the policy was first announced by
President Monroe, it was made very clear that it was an anti-imperial-
ist, anti-intervention policy that applied not just to the European states
but also to the United States. 7 As part of that declaration of policy,
the United States itself pledged that it would not intervene in the af-
fairs of Latin and Central America. Unfortunately, that policy did not
last and the United States began a rather notable history of repeated
intervention in the affairs of practically all the nations in Latin and
U.S. support for the contras was aimed at overthrowing the Nicaraguan government,
not at interdicting arms, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1983).
35. See Brinkly, "Vote on Nicaraguan Rebels: Either Way a Turning Point,"
N.Y. Times, March 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
36. STONE, Legal Controls of International Conflict 245 (1954), Bowett, supra
note 31, at 206-207, 216-217; Falk, "The Cambodian Operation and International
Law," 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1971), reprinted in 3 VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 33 (Falk ed. 1972).
37. In a letter to the American Minister in Columbia in 1829, Secretary of State
van Buren declared:
It is the ancient and well-settled policy of this country not to interfere with the
internal affairs of any foreign country. However deeply the President might regret
changes in the governments of the neighboring American States, which he might
deem inconsistent with those free and liberal principles which lie at the foundation
of our own, he would not, on that account, advise or countenance a departure from
this policy. [emphasis added]
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1906).
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Central America. 8
The United States is not practicing self-defense in Central
America or in Nicaragua. It is practicing a policy of intervention and a
policy of war; the United States is attempting to change the internal
politics, the internal social and economic structure of Nicaragua, be-
cause the United States does not like that structure. It is precisely this
type of attempt to dominate and control other nations which creates
wars, and it is why the international legal structure under the United
Nations was established after World War II.
II.
A brief review of the World Court's final decision on the merits of
the case illustrates the principles stated earlier in this article. The
Court began by addressing the jurisdictional and procedural issues
posed by the refusal of the United States to participate in the proceed-
ings on the merits. Although Article 53 of the Statute gives the Court
the authority to determine a controversy even in the absence of a party,
the Court noted that it must still be satisfied that it has jurisdiction and
that the claim is well-founded in fact and law. To insure that the U.S.
position was not ignored, the Court made frequent reference to the ear-
lier submissions of the United States on jurisdiction, to the extent they
touched on the merits of the controversy. However, the Court reminded
the United States that it was nonetheless bound by the judgment.39
The ICJ next gave the United States a critical procedural victory,
by finding that the multilateral treaty reservation to U.S. acceptance of
ICJ jurisdiction prevented the Court from deciding this case under any
multilateral treaty."° This meant that the United Nations Charter, the
38. See R. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 102-140
(1974); W.O. DOUGLAS, HOLOCAUST OR HEMISPHERE CO-OP: CROSSROADS OF AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMACY (1971); W.A. WILLIAMS, TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1962);
R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION (1972); D. WISE & T. Ross, THE INVISI-
BLE GOVERNMENT (1964); P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); S.
NEARING & J. FREEMAN, DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, chapts. 5, 6, 9 (1925).
39. Judgment, supra note 7 at para. 28.
40. Id. at para. 56. The U.S. acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, supra note 10, states
that it excludes "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2)
the United States of America specifically agrees to jurisdiction." Id. The U.S. argued
in its countermemorial on jurisdiction that El Salvador was a party to the treaties in-
volved and would be affected by the decision of the Court, but was not a party to the
case, see supra note 13.
Indeed, El Salvador's petition to intervene in the case was denied as premature by
the Court, Nicaragua v. United States, ICJ Order with Regard to the Declaration of
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Charter of the Organization of American States, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, and other multilateral conventions could
not be used as bases for finding a violation of law by the United States.
However, the Court held that it still had jurisdiction to determine
whether the United States had violated customary international law
which exists independent of the multilateral treaties.41
In making its factual findings, the Court recognized the limitations
of its abilities in this area and treated the facts conservatively. 2 The
greatest weight was placed on the admissions and declarations of each
party, and on those pieces of evidence which were uncontested. How-
ever, the mere declarations of fact by government ministers were con-
sidered to be self-serving and entitled to little weight on either side
except as admissions of facts unfavorable to the state represented by
the declarant." Thus, the Court rejected Nicaragua's argument that
the United States has admitted its intervention by arguing self-defense
in its previous submissions."
Applying its criteria, the Court found that President Reagan au-
thorized the mining of Nicaraguan ports without warning to interna-
tional shipping,45 and that the United States was responsible for several
motorboat attacks, including the bombing of Corinto and the destruc-
tion of the oil tanks there." The Court further found the United States
responsible for high altitude reconnaissance overflights and low altitude
overflights that caused sonic booms over Managua on November 7-11,
1984.'
Most importantly, the Court found that the United States was the
primary party responsible for the financing, training, equipping, arm-
ing, training and organizing the FDN, the main contra army in the
north.' 8 However, the Court was not satisfied that the evidence
presented was sufficient to find that the contras could be treated as an
arm of the United States.49 Thus, the Court held that the United
States could not be held automatically liable for the conduct or miscon-
Intervention, 1984 I.C.J. REPORTS 215. In its Judgment, the Court agreed that El Sal-
vador was a nonparty affected by the decision. Judgment, supra note 7, at 36, paras.
51-52.
41. Id. at para. 179.
42. See id. at paras. 57-70.
43. Id. at paras. 64, 70.
44. Id. at para. 74.
45. Id. at para. 80.
46. Id. at para. 86.
47. Id. at para. 91.
48. Id. at para. 108.
49. Id. at para. 109-110.
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duct of the contras, but that the United States was liable only for its
own conduct in supporting the contras.50
Addressing the legal issues in the case, the Court made what will
no doubt be its most controversial ruling in this decision by determining
that although the U.N. Charter could not serve as the basis for finding
a violation by the United States, similar rules in customary interna-
tional law could be the basis for a decision.51 The Court noted, for
example, that the U.N. Charter provision on self-defense "refers to pre-
existing customary international law . . . ." Thus, ". . . Article 51 of the
Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 'natural' or 'in-
herent' right of self-defense, and it is hard to see how this can be other
than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been con-
firmed and influenced by the Charter." ' 2 Article 51 says nothing about
proportionality and necessity of the force used in self-defense, nor does
the Charter anywhere define "armed attack"; these concepts cannot be
understood without reference to customary law. 53 Thus, the concept of
self-defense as used in the Charter and as it exists in customary law
"do not have the same content" and are thus separate entities.5 '
Moreover, in determining customary international law, the Court
decided that it may examine the attitude of the parties and states in
general with respect to certain U.N. General Assembly resolutions55 or
other obligations assumed by the parties. 6 The Court even stated that
the multilateral treaties, although not an independent basis for finding
a violation, may nevertheless constitute evidence that certain principles
have been so universally accepted as to have become a part of interna-
tional law.51
On this basis, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding precept that
the threat or use of force against another state violates international
law, including the exercise of force through the use of "armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries."58 Customary international law also
forbids direct or indirect intervention into the affairs of another state.
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on mat-
50. Id. at para. 116.
51. Id. at para. 175, 179.
52. Id. at para. 176.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at para. 188.
56. Id. at para. 189.
57. Id. at paras. 190, 200, 218.
58. Id. at para. 195.
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ters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sov-
ereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,
economic, social and cultural system, and the formation of foreign
policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in
regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.5 9
With respect to mining of harbors, the Court found that custom-
ary international law has long prohibited the mining of ports without
notice to the shipping community. 0
Applying the law to the facts as found, the Court determined that
U.S. conduct in arming and training the contras constituted illegal use
of force under customary international law. The Court further noted
that the mere funding of contra activity amounted to unlawful inter-
vention into the affairs of another state, but was not illegal use of
force.6'
The Court also held that the United States violated international
law by mining the Nicaraguan harbors, 61 and by conducting overflights
of Nicaraguan territory.63 However, the Court stated that it could not
find, based on the facts presented, that the massive U.S. military ma-
neuvers on the Nicaraguan borders amounted to prohibited interven-
tion under international law."
Additionally, the Court further found that through the use of the
CIA Manual which encouraged assassinations, the United States en-
couraged the contras to commit certain acts "contrary to general prin-
ciples of international humanitarian law reflected in treaties. ' ' 6
In making its legal determinations, the Court discussed all of the
defenses and issues previously raised by the United States, the most
important of which was self-defense. Finding that Nicaragua had been
involved in transferring arms to El Salvador at least until 1981, the
Court went on to hold that such arms shipments did not legitimize U.S.
claims of self-defense.66 The Court held that arms shipments were not
an armed attack which justified the use of force in self-defense.6 7
Moreover, self-defense must be claimed by the party being attacked
59. Id. at para. 205.
60. Id. at para. 214.
61. Id. at paras. 228, 242.
62. Id. at para. 253.
63. Id. at para. 251.
64. Id. at para. 227.
65. Id. at paras. 255-256.
66. Id. at para. 238.
67. Id. at paras. 230, 249.
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(i.e., El Salvador), not an intervening third party (the United States).6 8
Since there is not a right of self-defense under these circumstances,
there is not a right of collective self-defense.69 The Court noted that it
could not find any evidence of a request for armed defense by El Salva-
dor, Honduras or Costa Rica. 70
The Court further found that the U.S. action was not proportion-
ate to the conduct allegedly justifying the use of force, and was not
calculated to address the alleged violations by Nicaragua. Indeed, the
Court-found that U.S. action against Nicaragua increased as evidence
of Nicaraguan arms shipments decreased.
7 1
In finding that the United States unlawfully intervened in Nicara-
gua, the Court declared it unimportant to determine whether the
United States intended to actually overthrow the government of Nica-
ragua. It was enough, said the Court, that the United States intended
to coerce the government into acting in a certain way, and intended to
support the contras, whose own intent was to overthrow the
government. 2
On its own, the Court examined domestic statutory restrictions on
U.S. aid which commenced on October 1, 1984, to the effect that aid to
the contras was limited to "humanitarian assistance". Rejecting the
implicit claim that such aid was lawful, the Court observed that to be
considered humanitarian, aid must be limited to humanitarian purposes
and must be given to everyone without discrimination. Since U.S. aid
was given only to one side, and supported military activities, it plainly
did not meet the test.73
The Court briefly considered and rejected other U.S. arguments to
support its conduct. The United States claimed that the Sandinistas
had broken the commitments to pluralistic democracy they made to the
Organization of American States at the time of the revolution. 74 The
Court found no evidence of any legally binding commitments and held
that such commitments, even if binding, could not justify U.S. inter-
vention or use of force.75 As to the U.S. claim that Nicaragua "had
taken significant steps towards establishing a totalitarian Communist
68. Id. at paras. 195-196, 199, 209.
69. Id. at para. 211.
70. Id. at paras 232-233.
71. Id. at para. 237.
72. Id. at para. 241.
73. Id. at paras. 242-243.
74. Id. at paras. 169-170.
75. Id. at paras. 261-262.
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dictatorship,"76 the Court curtly noted that the internal affairs of states
did not justify intervention;
However the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State
to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of custom-
ary international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of
the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole
of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political,
social, economic and cultural system of a State . . . .The Court
cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the
latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system."
This same reasoning extended to Nicaragua's foreign policy.7 8 The
Court treated in the same manner allegations that the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment did not respect human rights, and that it had militarized the
country.79
Addressing the treaty of friendship between the United States and
Nicaragua, the Court found that the U.S. armed attacks on ports and
oil installations and the mining of the harbors violated the treaty of
friendship,80 as did the trade embargo ordered by President Reagan on
May 1, 1985.81
Having found that U.S. conduct violated international law, the
Court ordered the United States to refrain from its unlawful conduct 8
and declared that the United States would be liable to Nicaragua for
restitution. Since the exact amount of damages needed to be ascer-
tained, the Court granted further proceedings at a later date to deter-
mine the amount due.88 However, the Court denied Nicaragua's re-
quest that it make an interim award of damages pending a "final
valuation."84
Although procedural aspects of the case may be controversial, the
Court grounded its decision in accepted standards of customary inter-
76. Id. at para. 263.
77. Id. at para. 263.
78. Id. at para. 265.
79. Id. at paras. 268-269.
80. Id. at paras. 275, 282. "Any action less calculated to serve the purpose of
strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between the Par-
ties . . . could hardly be imagined." Id. at para. 275.
81. Id. at paras. 276, 279, 282.
82. Id. at paras. 286-288.
83. Id. at paras. 283-284.
84. Id. at para. 285.
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national law. Even the vigorous dissent of Justice Schwebel relies, for
the most part, on lack of jurisdiction, procedural irregularities and the
claimed failure of the Court to recognize facts showing Nicaragua's
alleged aggression against its neighbors. Perhaps the most radical as-
pect of the decision is that the Court issued it at all, and that one of the
superpowers has had a national security claim subjected to the stric-
tures of international law as applied by a neutral tribunal.
III.
Although Nicaragua has won a judgment in its favor, the question
arises as to whether this judgment can be enforced. If this were a court
in the United States, enforcement would be simple. A prevailing plain-
tiff goes to the other side and demands payment of the judgment. If
they do not pay, then the plaintiff files a Request for Order of Execu-
tion with the Court. The Sheriff or United States Marshall goes to the
defendant's home or business and seizes property which is then sold at
auction. The proceeds go to satisfy the judgment. Unfortunately, it will
be very hard for the clerk of the International Court of Justice to come
to the United States to try and attach the Capitol Building or the
White House and sell it at auction to pay off the damages. Fortunately,
there may be another way of enforcing the judgment.
There are no sanctions that the International Court of Justice can
declare or enforce against the United States for failure to obey its judg-
ment. Article 94 of the U.N. Charter compels states to comply with
ICJ decisions in cases to which they are a party, and provides for ac-
tion by the Security Council in the event a party fails to comply. How-
ever, the United States can simply veto any Security Council action, as
it indeed did when Nicaragua brought the matter to the Security
Council. 84. The real issue of enforcement is not what the ICJ can do,
but what can be done here in the United States.
There is no reason why a party with proper standing should not be
able to bring an action in federal district court to enforce the judgment
of the World Court. 85 From almost the inception of the Republic, the
federal courts have had the power and authority to remedy a breach of
federal law by the Executive.8 A treaty is binding on the Executive in
84.1. See note 16, supra.
85. Indeed, such a suit is currently pending, Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, C.A. No. 86-2620 (D.D.C.) (Complaint filed September 23,
1986).
86. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the same way as any federal statute.8 7 Here, the United States entered
into a binding commitment to adjudicate all legal disputes in the World
Court, and to be bound by the judgment thereof. This commitment
should be treated no differently than international commercial arbitra-
tions, or labor arbitrations between unions and management.
The government response to such a suit will be that it intrudes in
an area specifically reserved to the President under the Constitution:
the conduct of foreign affairs. The case therefore presents a "political
question" which is not justiciable. Our response should be that this case
does not address Presidential conduct of foreign affairs. Instead, it ad-
dresses a peculiarly judicial function: the enforcement of an adjudica-
tion which was submitted to a neutral party by the voluntary contract
of two parties.88 The United States agreed, in the Statute of the ICJ,
and in the 1956 Treaty of Friendship with Nicaragua8 9 that disputes
would be submitted to binding resolution by the World Court. There is
nothing in domestic or international law which states that the President
has discretion to disobey a binding contractual commitment of the
United States to obey a World Court decision in a specific case submit-
ted for adjudication. To the contrary, U.S. domestic law and treaties
over the last 60 years support a U.S. commitment to final and binding
arbitration of international disputes. Treaties commit states to act in a
certain way with respect to each other. If one or more states then vio-
late the treaty, it is up to the parties to seek a resolution of that dis-
pute. With a decision to arbitrate (or litigate), there is indeed an ex-
plicit self-limitation on the exercise of sovereignty to the extent that the
tribunal is empowered to decide that case and render a binding deci-
sion. Having accepted this limitation, it would seem that no subsequent
assertion of a right to ignore the decision can prevail over the original
decision. While most international awards are difficult to enforce if the
loser refuses to abide by them, here a plaintiff would have available the
domestic courts of the state which has refused to abide by the award.
In Frelinghuysen v. Key,90 the Supreme Court recognized the
binding effect of international arbitration. Mexico and the United
States had established by treaty a joint commission for resolution of
private claims against the other nation. A U.S. company won a sizable
award which the U.S. government later suspected had been obtained by
87. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see Japan Whaling Association v. American Ceta-
cean Society, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 (1986).
88. Japan Whaling Assn., supra note 87.
89. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, January 21, 1956, United
States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 499, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (effective May 24, 1958).
90. Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63 (1883).
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fraud. Although Mexico distributed the awarded funds to the United
States as required under the treaty, the United States refused to trans-
fer the funds to the company pending an investigation. The company
filed a mandamus action.
In upholding the U.S. action, the Court emphasized that the U.S.
government's actions as to its own citizens was not governed by the
treaty, and further stated:
No nation treats with a citizen of another nation except through his
government. . . . As between the United States and Mexico, the
awards are final and conclusive until set aside by agreement be-
tween the two governments or otherwise. Mexico cannot, under the
terms of the treaty, refuse to make the payments at the times
agreed on if required by the United States. This she does not now
seek to do....
International arbitration must always proceed on the highest princi-
ples of national honor and integrity. Claims presented and evidence
submitted to such a tribunal must necessarily bear the impress of
the entire good faith of the government from which they come...
91
Thereafter, at the request of the President, Congress passed a law au-
thorizing the executive to seek review of the claim in the Court of
Claims, and to seek denial of the compensation if it was, indeed, the
product of fraud. The United States did proceed to court, the court
found fraud, and the company appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed
the courts below, and in doing so stated:
It was also said in argument that the act of Congress in some way -
not clearly defined by counsel - was inconsistent with the principles
underlying international arbitration, a mode for the settlement of
disputes between sovereign states that is now more than ever before
approved by civilized nations. We might well doubt the soundness
of any conclusion that could be regarded as weakening or tending
to weaken the force that should be attached to the finality of an
award made by an international tribunal of arbitration. So far
from the act of Congress having any result of that character, the
effect of such legislation is to strengthen the principle that an
award by a tribunal acting under the joint authority of two coun-
tries is conclusive between the governments concerned, and must be
91. Id., 110 U.S. at 71-73.
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executed in good faith unless there be ground to impeach the in-
tegrity of the tribunal itself.9 [emphasis added].
The United States has a long and firm policy of encouraging and
supporting private and pacific resolution of disputes, both domestic and
international. The Federal Arbitration Act93 sets out the procedure by
which the court will enforce agreements to arbitrate as well as the
awards themselves by private persons. The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly emphasized the importance of arbitration to the stability and regu-
larity of labor-management relations.94 Indeed, so important is that
policy that the Court will impute a no-strike clause to a collective bar-
gaining agreement that is silent on the subject, if the contract contains
an arbitration clause.95 Arbitration is the alternative to a strike, i.e.
violence and class struggle; the analogy to the international arena is
obvious.
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 96 provides a comprehensive scheme for the arbitration
and enforcement of awards in international commercial disputes, even
where sovereign states are parties. U.S. courts have enforced decisions
against other nations where they have determined that the state in-
volved specifically agreed to arbitrate the dispute and to have the deci-
sion be final and binding; in those circumstances, the state waives its
sovereign immunity.9 7
The United States has repeatedly entered into binding instruments
to have international disputes resolved by final and binding arbitration.
Indeed, 22 U.S.C. §261 states, "It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes
92. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 20 S. Ct. 169, 182
(1899).
93. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-9.
94. United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
95. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
96. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1985, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, Codified
in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1984).
97. See Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C.
1980); Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C.
1978); see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; H. Rep.
No. 94-1487, 94 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6604, 6617, 6627 (1976).
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through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably
avoided." '98 The act, never judicially examined, was passed as part of
the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916,'0 which provided an ambitious
naval building program in response to the ominous course of the Euro-
pean War. The legislative history of the act shows that members of
Congress were specifically concerned with resolving major issues of dis-
pute with other nations through binding arbitration.99.1
As recently as 1985, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act'01
gave permanent authority to pay expenses for arbitrations "and other
proceedings for the peaceful resolution of disputes under treaties and
other international agreements." 101
The United States further committed itself to such adjudication
through its ratification of such multilateral treaties as the U.N. Char-
ter, the ICJ Statute, the Hague Convention of 1907, and various multi-
lateral inter-American treaties.102 The United States has also agreed to
such adjudication of disputes through numerous bilateral treaties of
friendship, commerce and navigation. These commitments to arbitrate
or adjudicate before the ICJ are not limited to commercial matters, but
include all issues of dispute, including those that would encompass the
use of force.
Whether a federal court would enforce this World Court decision
is, at the time of writing this article, unknown. The political question
doctrine offers an attractive avenue for any court to avoid a decision on
a complicated and murky yet highly charged issue. However, the fed-
eral courts should not be allowed to duck important issues and, at their
best, they have not done so. United States v. Nixon 0 ' was a key deci-
sion in the history of this country, in which a claim of unlimited presi-
dential authority was decisively quashed. In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion' 0 the Supreme Court determined that it would outlaw segregation
and that it would embark on a legal crusade to end the institutional
underlinings of racial discrimination. There is potential for taking a
98. 39 Stat. 618 (1916).
99. Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, P.L. No. 241, c. 417, 39 Stat. 556 (1916).
99.1. See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 8793, 8813, 8814, 8877, 9143, (1916); but see
Remarks of Rep. Gardner, id. at 9140-9141.
100. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, P.L. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405.
101. Id., section 111, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2710(a); see also 1985 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 366 (1985).
102. See generally, M. HABICHT, POST-WAR TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC STATE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (1931); Lieverman and Schneider, Memorandum
of Law on U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, passim (Nov. 1985).
103. See U.S. v. Nixon, supra note 86.
104. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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similarly courageous stance here. There is little doubt that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice decision is a golden opportunity to have a fed-
eral court in the United States review the legality of U.S. policy in
Nicaragua.
Lastly, the enforceability of the decision is in many ways not a
legal issue, but a political and moral issue. I use the term "political" in
the broadest sense, not to refer to Democrats and Republicans, but to
refer to the accumulation, use, and control of power in this society.
Enforcement of the ICJ decision touches on whether the checks and
balances of constitutional democracy can function in the nuclear age,
or whether we are all subordinate to an Executive Branch which can
act without restraint.
Nor can the moral dimension be ignored. U.S. policy in Nicaragua
is not wrong simply because it is illegal. The policy is illegal because it
is wrong, because it violates fundamental notions of civilized conduct
which are the basis of international law. By refusing to obey the World
Court decision, the United States has publicly and starkly repudiated
the dream of the postwar world: that nations would recognize a higher
authority than the power of their own armies. The U.S. rejection of the
United Nations' proscription against war is all the more tragic because
of the key role played by the United States in creating and defining the
new responsibilities of states.
It was just forty years ago that the judges of the International
Military Tribunal, sitting at Nuremberg, condemned the leaders of the
Nazi organizations for the crimes of the Third Reich. As defined in the
Tribunal's charter, one set of offenses to be punished was "crimes
against peace." The Charter essentially restated the accepted interna-
tional prohibition against the use of war and aggression as instruments
of policy. It defined such crimes as:
... [Pilanning, preparation, initiation, or waging of war of aggres-
sion, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.108
The United States took the position at Nuremburg that by 1939,
aggression was recognized as a violation of customary international
law. The position was forcefully stated by Robert H. Jackson, chief
U.S. prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal and an Associ-
105. Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 3 Bevans 1238, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, Article 6(a).
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ate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 10 In his opening address, he
repeatedly expressed the point that international law applied to all na-
tions, not just those defeated in war:
But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevita-
ble in a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen
responsible to law. And let me make clear that while this law is
first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it
is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any
other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment.0 7
As defined by Justice Jackson, "aggression" in international law was
not limited to invasion or declaration of war, but also included:
[p]rovision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of
another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded
state, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its power to
deprive those bands of all assistance or protection. 108
Justice Jackson then ended with a stirring statement that "the real
complaining party at your bar is Civilization." Civilization, he
continued,
does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does expect
that your juridical action will put the forces of International Law,
its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on the
side of peace .... 109
I think we have to make sure that our present leaders understand
that we want them to put our nation's power on the side of peace. The
United States has to be bound by the same standards of conduct, the
same sense of international decency, that we expect the Soviet Union,
Lebanon, Syria, or any other nation in the world to abide by. There has
to be one standard of conduct for all nations: that states will not inter-
vene in the affairs of other nations, that they will not resort to war, and
that they will seek peaceful resolution of their disputes. I think most
people who have read about Central America correctly understand and
106. 1 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major German War
Criminals 145-149 (1947).
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believe that the disputes in Central America can be resolved through
peaceful negotiations, and that Nicaragua is willing to do that. The
principal obstacle to peaceful negotiations in Central America right
now is not Nicaragua or the Soviet Union or the Cuban advisors; it is
the policies of this Administration. It is our responsibility as American
citizens to see that this obstacle to peace is removed.
As this article receives its final revisions for publication, the media
has broken the story of how the United States secretly sold arms to
Iran and then diverted payments for the arms to finance contra opera-
tions in Nicaragua, during a time when such U.S. aid was prohibited
by Congress. At the same time, the press is reporting intimate involve-
ment of administration officials in the purchase and shipment of arms
to the contras, and even possibile involvement by National Security
Council personnel in creating a media campaign during the 1984 elec-
tions to defeat Members of Congress opposed to contra aid. While the
details of these stories remain sketchy (and to some extent unverified),
even the undisputed facts show a much more intense and emotional
commitment of this administration to military action against the Nica-
raguan government than was previously thought.
Indeed, the recent revelations show nothing less than an adminis-
tration obsession with Nicaragua - an obsession as self-destructive as
it is unwise. One wonders what former Ambassador Quainton would
have said in our meeting had he known then what the public now
knows.
It is perhaps no accident that a policy declared unlawful by the
International Court of Justice was also carried out in a manner which
necessitated keeping Congress and the American public unaware of its
treu nature and extent. As we should have learned in Vietnam, lawless-
ness and deceit in foreign policy go hand in hand. The result is not just
misadventure abroad, but damage to the normal constitutional checks
and balances at home.
In 1964, as officials of the Johnson administration secretly planned
a sharp escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, National Security
Advisor William Bundy expressed his concern that such a secret plan
might not work in "the klieg lights of democracy." 105 His fears proved
justified; the more the public found out about the war, the more they
opposed it. The more the executive branch sought to hide key facts
from Congress and the public, the more bitter was the public rejection
of the policy as the supressed facts came to light. Presidents Johnson
and Nixon saw their presidencies destroyed because they pursued the
110. Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel Edition) 648 (1971).
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war in Indochina long after it had lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the
world, including the eyes of the American public.
President Reagan now faces a similar problem. The recent press
stories serve the same function as the decision of the World Court, in
that they strip the administration policy of legitimacy. It remains to be
seen whether the present administration will relinquish its obsession
with Nicaragua, even for the sake of its own survival.
